# After Defeat: Governing Party Response to Electoral Loss

## Supporting Information


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May 25, 2018

## Contents




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# A1 RHS Variables: Operationalization and Measurement

## A1.1 Operationalization

All right hand side variables, including the treatment, moderators, and covariates are listed in Table A1. This table excludes fixed effects. In some specifications, moderators serve as covariates.

| Variable Name | Source | Construction |
|---|---|---|
| A: Main Treatment Indicator | | |
| *Loss of Power*$_{it}$ | Hand coded, cross-checked with Williams and Seki (2016) | Non-caretaker government party prior to $t$ is no longer a coalition member after election $t$ |
| B: Moderators | | |
| *To Extreme*$_{t-1}$ | MARPOR | Following Equation 2, lagged by one election. Represents shift from platform $t-1$ to $t$. |
| *Absolute Shift*$_{t-1}$ | MARPOR | Following Equation 1, lagged by one election. Represents shift from platform $t-1$ to $t$. |
| *Large Selectorate*$_{it}$ | Kenig, Rahat, and Hazan (2013) supplemented by additional hand-coding | Binary: 1 indicates party convention or more inclusive (open, closed primaries); 0 indicates more restrictive than party convention (most commonly delegates to a convention, parliamentary caucus) |
| *Low Growth*$_{t}$ | OECD and Bolt and van Zanden (2013) | Binary: Coded as 1 if the year preceding an election is more than one country standard deviation below the country average across all years. |
| C: Covariates | | |
| *Voteshare*$_{it}$ | MARPOR | National vote share for party $i$ in election $t$. Presidential vote share in the US. |
| $\Delta$ *Voteshare*$_{it}$ | MARPOR | National vote share$_t$-National vote share$_{t-1}$ |
| *Out of Coalition*$_{it}$ | Hand coded, cross-checked with Williams and Seki (2016) | Coalition member prior to $t$ is no longer a coalition member after election $t$ |

Table A1: Construction of main variables used in estimation. This table excludes fixed effects used in estimation.

## A1.2 Descriptive Statistics

| | Observations | Mean | Minimum | Quartile 1 | Median | Quartile 3 | Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Loss of Power* | 1891 | 0.09 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| *To Extreme*$_{t-1}$ | 1886 | -0.33 | -124.02 | -10.10 | -0 | 9.05 | 102.10 |
| *Absolute Shift*$_{t-1}$ | 1886 | 13.11 | 0 | 3.59 | 9.51 | 18.60 | 124.02 |
| *Large Selectorate*$_{it}$ | 1282 | 0.72 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| *Low Growth*$_{t}$ | 1424 | 0.11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| *Voteshare*$_{it}$ | 1891 | 18.54 | 0 | 6.15 | 13.18 | 30.38 | 67.88 |
| $\Delta$ Voteshre$_{it}$ | 1891 | -0.10 | -35.83 | -2.14 | -0.08 | 1.95 | 29.62 |
| *Out of Coalition*$_{it}$ | 1891 | 0.12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |

Table A2: Descriptive statistics for each of the main RHS covariates used in regression specifications.

# A2 Platform Classification

## A2.1 Alternate Definitions of Platform Classification

We redefine the definition of the categorical classification of a center platform in two ways:

1. Define mean and standard deviation with respect to a three election moving average including elections $t-2$, $t-1$, and $t$. Note that to construct the moving average, we loose the first two elections from each country, resulting in a slightly lower sample size.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Center Platform$_{t+1}$ | | | | | | |
| Loss of Power | -0.113$^{*}$ | -0.145$^{*}$ | -0.124$^{+}$ | -0.125$^{+}$ | -0.145$^{*}$ | -0.093 | -0.187$^{+}$ |
| | (0.057) | (0.064) | (0.067) | (0.066) | (0.066) | (0.079) | (0.108) |
| Voteshare$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| $\Delta$ Voteshare$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Platform$_t$ FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| In Coalition$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Election FE | | yes | | | yes | yes | yes |
| Party FE | | | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Decade FE | | | | yes | | | |
| Sample | | | | | | Two-Party | > Two-Party |
| Observations | 1766 | 1766 | 1766 | 1766 | 1766 | 765 | 1001 |

Standard errors are clustered by party.
$^{+}p<0.10,^{*}p<0.05,^{**}p<0.005$

Table A3: Table 1 replicated for under the three election moving average of platform classifications.

2. Define the mean and standard deviation as in the paper but constrain a “right” party from being classified as having a “left” platform and vice versa.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Center Platform$_{t+1}$ | | | | | | |
| Loss of Power | -0.117$^{*}$ | -0.162$^{*}$ | -0.158$^{**}$ | -0.161$^{**}$ | -0.188$^{**}$ | -0.142$^{+}$ | -0.188$^{+}$ |
| | (0.051) | (0.062) | (0.050) | (0.050) | (0.063) | (0.078) | (0.097) |
| Voteshare$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| $\Delta$ Voteshare$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Platform$_t$ FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| In Coalition$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Election FE | | yes | | | yes | yes | yes |
| Party FE | | | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Decade FE | | | | yes | | | |
| Sample | | | | | | Two-Party | > Two-Party |
| Observations | 1888 | 1888 | 1888 | 1888 | 1888 | 814 | 1074 |

Standard errors are clustered by party.
$^{+}p < 0.10, ^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.005$

Table A4: Table 1 replicated for under the restricted version of the main definition of platform classification.

### A2.2 Robustness: Alternate Bandwidths

In the main text, we define platforms according to the following formula:

$$\text{Platform classification}_t^{ic} = \begin{cases} \text{Left} & \text{if } P_t^{ic} < \mu_{P^c} - \frac{1}{2}\sigma_{P^c} \\ \text{Center} & \text{if } P_t^{ic} \in [\mu_{P^c} - \frac{1}{2}\sigma_{P^c}, \mu_{P^c} + \frac{1}{2}\sigma_{P^c}] \\ \text{Right} & \text{if } P_t^{ic} > \mu_{P^c} + \frac{1}{2}\sigma_{P^c} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

Here, we assess the robustness of the main finding to alternate bandwidths than $\frac{1}{2}$ country standard deviation. Specifically, we examine bandwidths from $\frac{1}{20}$ to 1 to assess the robustness of the negative association between loss of power and subsequent adoption of a center platform. Note that as the bandwidth increases, the share of "center" platforms also increases. The size of this "center" category is necessary for the interpretation of the point estimates on "Loss of Power." Note that regardless of of the bandwidth or operationalization of the dependent variable in Figure A1, all point estimates are negative.




Figure A1: This graph plots the estimates from the specification in Column (5) of Tables 1 (main text), A3, and A4 with alternate bandwidths for the definition of a "center" platform. Confidence intervals are constructed from standard errors clustered by party. Thick lines correspond to 90% confidence intervals and thin lines correspond to 95% confidence intervals.

### A2.3 Markov Analysis of Platform Shifts

Using each of the three definitions above, we code the distribution of platforms in time $t$ to time $t+1$, subsequent to loss and victory. For this analysis we condition the sample on the 383 governing parties in the sample (the sample in the placebo graph).

1. **Baseline Platform Classification, Main Text**

| After Re-Election | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Left | Center | Right |
| Left | 0.65 | 0.29 | 0.06 |
| Center | 0.15 | 0.58 | 0.27 |
| Right | 0.05 | 0.46 | 0.49 |

| After Loss | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Left | Center | Right |
| Left | 0.77 | 0.21 | 0.03 |
| Center | 0.21 | 0.50 | 0.29 |
| Right | 0.13 | 0.23 | 0.64 |

Table A5: Estimated transition matrices subsequent to re-election and loss. Includes only parties that were in power going into the election in time $t$.

2. **Moving Average-Based Platform Classification, Table A3**

| After Re-Election | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Left | Center | Right |
| Left | 0.57 | 0.31 | 0.12 |
| Center | 0.19 | 0.49 | 0.31 |
| Right | 0.07 | 0.38 | 0.55 |

| After Loss | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Left | Center | Right |
| Left | 0.61 | 0.34 | 0.05 |
| Center | 0.36 | 0.36 | 0.29 |
| Right | 0.12 | 0.19 | 0.68 |

Table A6: Estimated transition matrices subsequent to re-election and loss. Includes only parties that were in power going into the election in time $t$ for whom the moving average is defined ($n = 353$).

3. **Restricted Platform Classification, Table A4**

| After Re-Election | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Left | Center | Right |
| Left | 0.68 | 0.32 | 0.00 |
| Center | 0.11 | 0.74 | 0.14 |
| Right | 0.00 | 0.40 | 0.60 |

| After Loss | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Left | Center | Right |
| Left | 0.83 | 0.17 | 0.00 |
| Center | 0.21 | 0.59 | 0.20 |
| Right | 0 | 0.28 | 0.72 |

Table A7: Estimated transition matrices subsequent to re-election and loss. Includes only parties that were in power going into the election in time $t$.

### A2.4 Illustrative Examples: Coding of US and UK Platforms

With respect to the coding of platforms we provide case evidence from platforms over the time series in the US and the UK. Tables A8 and A9 indicate the classification of platforms in the main coding. Here consider the elections in which the party was in power preceding the election. The cases with brackets in black are constrained to a center platform (rather than the platform opposite ideology) in the restricted classification. Their classification under the restricted measure appears in red.

**UK**

| | | To Extreme | | | | To Center | | No Change | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Party | Result | $C \rightarrow L$ | $C \rightarrow R$ | $R \rightarrow L$ | $L \rightarrow R$ | $L \rightarrow C$ | $R \rightarrow C$ | $L \rightarrow L$ | $C \rightarrow C$ | $R \rightarrow R$ |
| Conservative | V | | | | | [1959] | | 1955 | [1959] | 1983 |
| | | | | | | | | | | 1987 |
| | | | | | | | | | | 1992 |
| | L | | 1964 | | | | | | | 1997 |
| | | | 1974a | | | | | | | |
| Liberal | V | | | | | | [2001] | 1950 | 1966 | |
| | | | | | | | | 1974b | [2001] | |
| | | | | | | | | | 2005 | |
| | L | 1970 | | | | | | 1951 | | |
| | | 2010 | | | | | | 1979 | | |

Table A8: UK elections and movement of (former) governing parties subsequent to loss. A result of **V**ictory corresponds to re-election wheras a result of **L**oss indicates a loss of power. The elections "1974a" and "1974b" correspond to the elections of February and October 1974, respectively. Entries in brackets indicate discrepancy between the main (black) and restricted (red) platform classification measures.

**US**

| | | To Extreme | | | | To Center | | No Change | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Party | Result | $C \rightarrow L$ | $C \rightarrow R$ | $R \rightarrow L$ | $L \rightarrow R$ | $L \rightarrow C$ | $R \rightarrow C$ | $L \rightarrow L$ | $C \rightarrow C$ | $R \rightarrow R$ |
| Democrat | V | | | | | | | 1964 | 1996 | |
| | L | | | | | | | 1952 | 2000 | |
| | | | | | | | | 1968 | | |
| | | | | | | | | 1980 | | |
| Republican | V | | 1956 | | | | | | 1972 | 1984 |
| | | | | | | | | | | 1988 |
| | | | | | | | | | | 2004 |
| | L | | [1960] | [1960] | | | | | 1992 | |
| | L | | 1976 | | | | | | | 1992 |
| | | | | | | | | | | 2008 |

Table A9: US elections and movement of (former) governing parties subsequent to loss. A result of **V**ictory corresponds to re-election wheras a result of **L**oss indicates a loss of power. Entries in brackets indicate discrepancy between the main (black) and restricted (red) platform classification measures.

## A3 Alternate Specifications

In this section, we re-estimate relevant portions of the the four tables reported in the main text under three alternate specifications, as following:

1. *No reweighting by country:* We do not reweight observations in the dataset by the inverse of a country's proportion of observations in the dataset.

2. *Reweighting by election:* We reweight observations in the dataset by the inverse of an election's proportion of observations in the dataset.

3. *No reweighting and subsetting the sample to governing parties prior to election $t$*: We subset the sample to all incumbent governing parties holding office preceding a relevant election. These specifications depart slightly from those in the main text because we cannot estimate these models with election fixed effects.

### A3.1 Robustness of Table 1: Probability of Centrist Platforms

Tables A10-A12 demonstrate the robustness of the finding of a negative association between loss of power and subsequent probability of adopting a center platform in the subsequent election.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Center Platform$_{t+1}$ | | | |
| Loss of Power$_t$ | -0.100$^{*}$ | -0.141$^{**}$ | -0.122$^{**}$ | -0.124$^{**}$ | -0.160$^{**}$ | -0.147$^{*}$ | -0.162$^{*}$ |
| | (0.038) | (0.039) | (0.041) | (0.039) | (0.043) | (0.070) | (0.057) |
| Voteshare$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| $\Delta$ Voteshare$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Platform$_t$ FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Out of Coalition$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Election FE | | yes | | | yes | yes | yes |
| Party FE | | | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Decade FE | | | | yes | | | |
| Sample | | | | | | Two-Party | > Two-Party |
| Observations | 1888 | 1888 | 1888 | 1888 | 1888 | 814 | 1074 |

Standard errors are clustered by party.
$^{+}p < 0.10, ^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.005$

Table A10: Standard errors clustered by party. No reweighting of the data.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Center Platform$_{t+1}$ | | | | | | |
| Loss of Power$_t$ | -0.100$^{*}$ | -0.141$^{**}$ | -0.122$^{**}$ | -0.124$^{**}$ | -0.160$^{**}$ | -0.147$^{*}$ | -0.162$^{*}$ |
| | (0.038) | (0.039) | (0.041) | (0.039) | (0.043) | (0.070) | (0.057) |
| Voteshare$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| $\Delta$ Voteshare$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Platform$_t$ FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Out of Coalition$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Election FE | | yes | | | yes | yes | yes |
| Party FE | | | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Decade FE | | | | yes | | | |
| Sample | | | | | | Two-Party | > Two-Party |
| Observations | 1888 | 1888 | 1888 | 1888 | 1888 | 814 | 1074 |

Standard errors are clustered by party.
$^{+}p < 0.10, ^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.005$

Table A11: Standard errors clustered by party. Data is weighted by the inverse of the proportion of observations comprising an election.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Center Platform$_{t+1}$ | | | | | | |
| Loss of Power | -0.136$^{**}$ | -0.167$^{**}$ | -0.152$^{*}$ | -0.134$^{+}$ | -0.095 | -0.049 | -0.130 |
| | (0.040) | (0.058) | (0.056) | (0.071) | (0.069) | (0.091) | (0.119) |
| Voteshare$_t$ | | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| $\Delta$ Voteshare$_t$ | | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Platform$_t$ FE | | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Out of Coalition$_t$ | | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Country FE | | | yes | | | | |
| Party FE | | | | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Decade FE | | | | | yes | yes | yes |
| Sample | Governing | Governing | Governing | Governing | Governing | Governing, Two-Party | Governing, > Two-Party |
| Observations | 383 | 382 | 382 | 382 | 382 | 198 | 184 |

Standard errors are clustered by party.
$^{+}p < 0.10, ^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.005$

Table A12: Standard errors clustered by party. No reweighting of the data, sample includes only governing parties going into election $t$.

## A3.2 Robustness of Table 2: Loss of Power and Magnitude of Reversal

Tables A13-A15 demonstrate the robustness of the finding of that loss of power is associated with a larger magnitude of reversal relative to the previous shift in platforms.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | To Extreme, $t+1$ | | | | |
| Loss of Power | -0.090 | -0.069 | -0.869 | 0.766 | 0.743 | -0.180 | -4.910 | 2.782 |
| | (1.879) | (1.755) | (2.208) | (1.991) | (2.006) | (2.509) | (4.026) | (3.097) |
| To Extreme$_t$ | -0.410$^{**}$ | -0.388$^{**}$ | -0.382$^{**}$ | -0.412$^{**}$ | -0.416$^{**}$ | -0.411$^{**}$ | -0.348$^{**}$ | -0.462$^{**}$ |
| | (0.026) | (0.028) | (0.029) | (0.031) | (0.032) | (0.032) | (0.058) | (0.034) |
| Lose Power $\times$ To Extreme$_t$ | | -0.193$^{*}$ | -0.178$^{*}$ | -0.194$^{*}$ | -0.186$^{*}$ | -0.173$^{+}$ | -0.335 | -0.102 |
| | | (0.071) | (0.085) | (0.074) | (0.075) | (0.103) | (0.219) | (0.101) |
| Voteshare | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| $\Delta$ Voteshare | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Platform, $t$ FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Out of Coalition, $t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Election FE | | | yes | | | yes | yes | yes |
| Party FE | | | | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Decade FE | | | | | yes | | | |
| Sample | | | | | | | Two-Party | > Two-Party |
| Observations | 1885 | 1885 | 1885 | 1885 | 1885 | 1885 | 812 | 1073 |

Standard errors are clustered by party.
$^{+}p < 0.10, ^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.005$

Table A13: Standard errors clustered by party. No reweighting of the data.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | To Extreme, $t+1$ | | | | |
| Loss of Power | -0.038 | 0.119 | -1.065 | 1.062 | 0.925 | -0.129 | -3.805 | 3.064 |
| | (1.931) | (1.842) | (2.129) | (2.122) | (2.079) | (2.430) | (4.053) | (2.799) |
| To Extreme, $t$ | -0.427$^{**}$ | -0.406$^{**}$ | -0.395$^{**}$ | -0.428$^{**}$ | -0.433$^{**}$ | -0.422$^{**}$ | -0.382$^{**}$ | -0.472$^{**}$ |
| | (0.028) | (0.033) | (0.030) | (0.036) | (0.037) | (0.034) | (0.057) | (0.037) |
| Lose Power $\times$ To Extreme$_t$ | | -0.194$^{*}$ | -0.165$^{+}$ | -0.189$^{*}$ | -0.181$^{*}$ | -0.159 | -0.303 | -0.087 |
| | | (0.070) | (0.084) | (0.073) | (0.074) | (0.102) | (0.221) | (0.085) |
| Voteshare | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| $\Delta$ Voteshare | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Platform, $t$ FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Out of Coalition, $t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Election FE | | | yes | | | yes | yes | yes |
| Party FE | | | | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Decade FE | | | | | yes | | | |
| Sample | | | | | | | Two-Party | > Two-Party |
| Observations | 1885 | 1885 | 1885 | 1885 | 1885 | 1885 | 812 | 1073 |

Standard errors are clustered by party.
$^{+}p < 0.10, ^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.005$

Table A14: Standard errors clustered by party. Data is weighted by the inverse of the proportion of observations comprising an election.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | To Extreme, $t+1$ | | | |
| Loss of Power | -0.206 | -0.346 | 0.559 | 0.805 | 0.780 | -0.769 | 1.143 |
| | (2.424) | (2.345) | (2.531) | (2.977) | (3.173) | (3.866) | (4.655) |
| To Extreme, $t$ | -0.511$^{**}$ | -0.443$^{**}$ | -0.442$^{**}$ | -0.440$^{**}$ | -0.438$^{**}$ | -0.396$^{**}$ | -0.501$^{**}$ |
| | (0.048) | (0.043) | (0.050) | (0.055) | (0.058) | (0.078) | (0.091) |
| Lose Power $\times$ To Extreme$_t$ | | -0.137$^{+}$ | -0.148$^{+}$ | -0.170$^{+}$ | -0.179$^{+}$ | -0.361$^{*}$ | -0.073 |
| | | (0.074) | (0.079) | (0.091) | (0.094) | (0.161) | (0.112) |
| Platform, $t$ FE | | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Out of Coalition, $t$ | | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Country FE | | | yes | | | | |
| Party FE | | | | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Decade FE | | | | | yes | yes | yes |
| Sample | Governing | Governing | Governing | Governing | Governing | Governing, Two-Party | Governing, > Two-Party |
| Observations | 382 | 382 | 382 | 382 | 382 | 198 | 184 |

Standard errors are clustered by party.
$^{+}p < 0.10, ^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.005$

Table A15: Standard errors clustered by party. No reweighting of the data, sample includes only governing parties going into election $t$.

### A3.3 Robustness of Table 3, Panel B: Loss of Power, Selectorate Size, and Shift Magnitude

Tables A16-A18 are generally aligned with the finding on selectorate size and the magnitude of post-loss shifts. We note that in Tables A16 and A17 the parties with small selectorates tend to make larger post-loss shifts and that the size of these shifts is attenuated substantially (if not significantly) in losing parties with larger selectorates. We are less powered to detect an interaction effect in the governing party sample. However, the point estimates are in the same direction within the subsample.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Shift Magnitude, $t+1$ | | | | | |
| Loss of Power$_t$ | 5.845$^{*}$ | 5.036$^{+}$ | 6.540$^{+}$ | 7.124$^{*}$ | 9.683$^{*}$ | -3.778 |
| | (2.827) | (2.911) | (3.566) | (3.337) | (3.815) | (4.832) |
| Large Selectorate$_t$ | 1.264 | 1.342 | 1.695 | 3.048 | 0.747 | 4.010$^{**}$ |
| | (1.284) | (2.106) | (1.194) | (2.421) | (6.324) | (1.306) |
| Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ Large Selectorate$_t$ | -3.410 | -2.208 | -5.874 | -6.013 | -4.764 | 1.889 |
| | (3.043) | (3.200) | (3.787) | (3.714) | (4.939) | (4.998) |
| Voteshare$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| $\Delta$ Voteshare$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Platform$_t$ FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Out of Coalition$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Country FE | yes | | yes | | | |
| Party FE | | yes | | yes | yes | yes |
| Decade FE | | yes | | | | |
| Election FE | | | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Sample | | | | | Two-Party | > Two Party |
| Observations | 1115 | 1115 | 1115 | 1115 | 551 | 564 |

Standard errors are clustered by party.

$^{+}p < 0.10, ^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.005$

Table A16: Standard errors clustered at the party level. No reweighting of the data.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Shift Magnitude$_{t+1}$ | | | |
| Loss of Power$_t$ | 6.535$^{*}$ | 5.037$^{+}$ | 8.779$^{*}$ | 8.386$^{*}$ | 10.134$^{*}$ | -3.948 |
| | (2.864) | (2.915) | (3.454) | (3.288) | (3.684) | (5.480) |
| Large Selectorate$_t$ | 0.334 | 0.077 | 1.404 | 3.385 | 1.236 | 5.531$^{**}$ |
| | (1.442) | (2.499) | (1.377) | (3.914) | (7.207) | (1.828) |
| Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ Large Selectorate$_t$ | -2.517 | -0.320 | -6.876$^{+}$ | -5.817 | -4.610 | 3.339 |
| | (3.305) | (3.524) | (3.800) | (3.834) | (4.890) | (5.506) |
| Voteshare$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| $\Delta$ Voteshare$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Platform$_t$ FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Out of Coalition$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Country FE | yes | | yes | | | |
| Party FE | | yes | | yes | yes | yes |
| Decade FE | | yes | | | | |
| Election FE | | | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Sample | | | | | Two-Party | > Two Party |
| Observations | 1115 | 1115 | 1115 | 1115 | 551 | 564 |

Standard errors are clustered by party.
$^{+}p < 0.10, ^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.005$

Table A17: Standard errors clustered by party. Data is weighted by the inverse of the proportion of observations comprising an election.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Shift Magnitude$_{t+1}$ | | | |
| Loss of Power$_t$ | 4.760 | 4.862 | 4.340 | 2.485 | 4.309 | -10.019 |
| | (3.316) | (3.396) | (3.655) | (3.990) | (4.165) | (11.206) |
| Large Selectorate$_t$ | -0.896 | -3.226 | -4.639$^{+}$ | -0.976 | -0.597 | 0.000 |
| | (1.541) | (2.953) | (2.362) | (4.248) | (5.101) | (.) |
| Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ Large Selectorate$_t$ | -1.437 | -1.256 | -2.159 | -1.577 | -2.336 | 7.811 |
| | (3.340) | (3.078) | (3.222) | (3.495) | (4.507) | (11.067) |
| Observations | 258 | 258 | 258 | 258 | 157 | 101 |
| Voteshare$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| $\Delta$ Voteshare$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Platform$_t$ FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Out of Coalition$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Country FE | | yes | | | | |
| Party FE | | | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Decade FE | | | | yes | yes | yes |
| Sample | Governing | Governing | Governing | Governing | Governing Two-Party | Governing > Two Party |

Standard errors are clustered by party.
$^{+}p < 0.10, ^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.005$

Table A18: Standard errors clustered by party. No reweighting of the data, sample includes only governing parties going into election $t$.

### A3.4 Robustness of Table 4: Loss of Power, Shift, and Return to Power

Tables A19-A21 demonstrate the robustness of the finding of that among parties that lose power in election $t$, shifts to the extreme in $t + 1$ are associated with a higher probability of return to power in $t + 2$.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | Government Party$_{t+2}$ | | | | | |
| Loss of Power$_t$ | -0.120$^{*}$ | -0.118$^{*}$ | -0.153$^{*}$ | -0.232$^{+}$ | -0.080 | -0.174$^{*}$ | -0.159$^{*}$ | -0.216$^{**}$ | -0.333$^{*}$ | -0.116 |
| | (0.057) | (0.053) | (0.065) | (0.121) | (0.062) | (0.067) | (0.063) | (0.075) | (0.139) | (0.082) |
| To Extreme$_{t+1}$ | -0.037 | -0.036 | -0.044 | -0.117 | -0.004 | | | | | |
| | (0.047) | (0.040) | (0.054) | (0.090) | (0.067) | | | | | |
| Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_{t+1}$ | 0.352$^{*}$ | 0.336$^{+}$ | 0.410$^{*}$ | 0.277 | 0.555$^{*}$ | | | | | |
| | (0.163) | (0.176) | (0.204) | (0.293) | (0.242) | | | | | |
| Shift Magnitude$_{t+1}$ | | | | | | -0.077 | -0.039 | -0.106 | -0.102 | -0.106 |
| | | | | | | (0.079) | (0.078) | (0.103) | (0.136) | (0.151) |
| Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ Absolute Shift$_{t+1}$ | | | | | | 0.372 | 0.294 | 0.445 | 0.691$^{+}$ | 0.309 |
| | | | | | | (0.242) | (0.261) | (0.301) | (0.399) | (0.444) |
| Voteshare$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| $\Delta$ Voteshare$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Platform$_t$ FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Out of Coalition$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Party FE | | yes | yes | yes | yes | | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Election FE | yes | | yes | yes | yes | yes | | yes | yes | yes |
| Sample | | | | Two-Party | > Two Party | | | | Two-Party | > Two Party |
| Observations | 1886 | 1886 | 1886 | 813 | 1073 | 1886 | 1886 | 1886 | 813 | 1073 |

Standard errors are clustered by party.
$^{+}p < 0.10, ^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.005$

Table A19: Standard errors clustered by party. No reweighting of the data.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | Government Party$_{t+2}$ | | | | | |
| Loss of Power$_t$ | -0.151* | -0.119$^+$ | -0.175* | -0.236$^+$ | -0.070 | -0.201* | -0.153* | -0.235* | -0.344* | -0.081 |
| | (0.070) | (0.064) | (0.079) | (0.137) | (0.072) | (0.078) | (0.076) | (0.086) | (0.147) | (0.089) |
| To Extreme$_{t+1}$ | -0.083 | -0.062 | -0.090 | -0.184$^+$ | -0.008 | | | | | |
| | (0.052) | (0.047) | (0.059) | (0.100) | (0.071) | | | | | |
| Loss$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_{t+1}$ | 0.362* | 0.350* | 0.415* | 0.451 | 0.476* | | | | | |
| | (0.163) | (0.176) | (0.195) | (0.298) | (0.239) | | | | | |
| Shift Magnitude$_{t+1}$ | | | | | | 0.012 | 0.046 | -0.012 | -0.022 | 0.003 |
| | | | | | | (0.083) | (0.094) | (0.108) | (0.135) | (0.176) |
| Loss$_t$ $\times$ Absolute Shift$_{t+1}$ | | | | | | 0.331 | 0.225 | 0.401 | 0.767* | 0.078 |
| | | | | | | (0.230) | (0.244) | (0.259) | (0.347) | (0.385) |
| Voteshare$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| $\Delta$ Voteshare$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Platform$_t$ FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Out of Coalition$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Party FE | | yes | yes | yes | yes | | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Election FE | yes | | yes | yes | yes | yes | | yes | yes | yes |
| Sample | | | | Two-Party | > Two Party | | | | Two-Party | > Two Party |
| Observations | 1885 | 1885 | 1885 | 812 | 1073 | 1885 | 1885 | 1885 | 812 | 1073 |

Standard errors are clustered by party.

$^+p < 0.10, ^* p < 0.05, ^{**} p < 0.005$

Table A20: Standard errors clustered by party. Data is weighted by the inverse of the proportion of observations comprising an election.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | Government Party$_{t+2}$ | | | | | |
| Loss of Power$_t$ | -0.236$^{**}$ | -0.032 | -0.088 | -0.118 | -0.036 | -0.187$^{*}$ | -0.019 | -0.094 | -0.125 | -0.035 |
| | (0.073) | (0.073) | (0.076) | (0.122) | (0.090) | (0.086) | (0.094) | (0.101) | (0.142) | (0.127) |
| To Extreme$_{t+1}$ | -0.285$^{+}$ | -0.359$^{+}$ | -0.380$^{*}$ | -0.361$^{+}$ | -0.384 | | | | | |
| | (0.163) | (0.182) | (0.175) | (0.207) | (0.299) | | | | | |
| Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_{t+1}$ | 0.566$^{*}$ | 0.674$^{*}$ | 0.695$^{*}$ | 0.598 | 0.720 | | | | | |
| | (0.244) | (0.283) | (0.291) | (0.362) | (0.500) | | | | | |
| Shift Magnitude$_{t+1}$ | | | | | | 0.513 | 0.241 | 0.026 | 0.007 | 0.087 |
| | | | | | | (0.313) | (0.371) | (0.353) | (0.473) | (0.489) |
| Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ Absolute Shift$_{t+1}$ | | | | | | -0.335 | 0.012 | 0.192 | 0.102 | 0.280 |
| | | | | | | (0.369) | (0.420) | (0.406) | (0.575) | (0.495) |
| Voteshare$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| $\Delta$ Voteshare$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Platform$_t$ FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Out of Coalition$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Party FE | | yes | yes | yes | yes | | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Decade FE | | | yes | yes | yes | | | yes | yes | yes |
| Sample | Gov. | Gov. | Gov. | Gov., Two-Party | Gov., > Two Party | Gov. | Gov. | Gov. | Gov., Two-Party | Gov., > Two Party |
| Observations | 382 | 382 | 382 | 198 | 184 | 382 | 382 | 382 | 198 | 184 |

Standard errors are clustered by party.
$^{+}p < 0.10, ^{*} p < 0.05, ^{**} p < 0.005$

Table A21: Standard errors clustered by party. No reweighting of the data, sample includes only governing parties going into election $t$.

## A4 Alternate Routes to Loss of Power

Our argument is premised upon the relationship of loss of power to electoral defeat. However, the mapping of electoral fortunes to loss of power varies across cases in our study. In 148/184 of cases of loss of power, the party did indeed lose vote share from elections $t-1$ to $t$. In this section, we account for this variation. To conduct this analysis systematically, we examine how our main findings vary in $\Delta$ *Voteshare*$_{it}$, the difference in vote share of party $i$ from election $t-1$ to $t$. Where $\Delta$ *Voteshare*$_{it} < 0$, a party loses votes between $t-1$ and $t$.

In this section we ask whether there exists heterogeneity in our findings with respect to $\Delta$ *Voteshare*$_{it}$. We do this by replicating the main specifications in Tables 1-4 with interactions with two forms of $\Delta$ *Voteshare*$_{it}$:

- $\Delta$ *Voteshare*$_{it}$: This enters the continuous covariate $\Delta$ *Voteshare*$_{it}$ as an interaction with treatment and any moderators described in the main text.

- *Loss of voteshare*$_{it}$: Here we interact the binary variable constructed from $I[\Delta$ *Voteshare*$_{it}] \geq 0$ with the treatment and any moderators described in the main text. This estimator distinguishes between cases where a party lost power and voteshare (148/181 instances) from those where a party lost power while gaining voteshare (36/181 instances).

Note that the triple interactions in this section are (statistically) underpowered. Our aim is mainly to assess the sign and magnitude of the main effects in settings where erosion of vote share coincides with loss of power.

Table A4 replicates Table 1 from the main text while examining heterogeneity in $\Delta$ *Voteshare*$_{it}$. We observe that in both Panels A and B, loss of power is strongly associated with a reduction in the adoption of centrist platforms in election $t+1$. This relationship does not appear to be moderated by $\Delta$ *Voteshare*$_{it}$ (Panel A) and the relationship is quite similar among only cases in which loss of power and loss of voteshare coincide (first row of Panel B).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Center Platform$_{t+1}$ | | | |
| **Panel A: Interaction with (Continuous) $\Delta$ Vote Share$_t$** | | | | | | | |
| Loss of Power$_t$ | -0.113$^*$ | -0.176$^{**}$ | -0.152$^*$ | -0.154$^{**}$ | -0.185$^{**}$ | -0.104 | -0.209$^*$ |
| | (0.054) | (0.054) | (0.055) | (0.054) | (0.053) | (0.077) | (0.075) |
| $\Delta$ Voteshare$_t$ | -0.001 | -0.006$^+$ | -0.001 | -0.002 | -0.007 | -0.006 | -0.007 |
| | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ $\Delta$ Voteshare$_t$ | 0.000 | 0.001 | -0.004 | -0.003 | 0.000 | 0.010 | -0.009 |
| | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.009) | (0.012) | (0.012) |
| **Panel B: Interaction with Binary Indicator for Loss of Vote Share$_t$** | | | | | | | |
| Loss of Power$_t$ | -0.117$^*$ | -0.166$^*$ | -0.092$^+$ | -0.093$^+$ | -0.133$^*$ | -0.164$^*$ | -0.091 |
| | (0.050) | (0.061) | (0.051) | (0.052) | (0.060) | (0.074) | (0.100) |
| Loss of Voteshare$_t$ | -0.031 | -0.044 | -0.020 | -0.023 | -0.012 | -0.042 | 0.010 |
| | (0.026) | (0.029) | (0.029) | (0.029) | (0.032) | (0.045) | (0.045) |
| Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ Loss of Voteshare$_t$ | 0.009 | 0.074 | -0.210$^+$ | -0.202$^+$ | -0.072 | 0.264$^+$ | -0.166 |
| | (0.111) | (0.123) | (0.107) | (0.110) | (0.126) | (0.141) | (0.157) |
| Voteshare$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Platform$_t$ FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Out of Coalition$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Election FE | | yes | | | yes | yes | yes |
| Party FE | | | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Decade FE | | | | yes | | | |
| Sample | | | | | | Two-Party | > Two-Party |
| Observations | 1888 | 1888 | 1888 | 1888 | 1888 | 814 | 1074 |

Standard errors are clustered by party.
$^+p < 0.10, ^* p < 0.05, ^{**} p < 0.005$

Table A22: Standard errors clustered at the party level. Countries are weighted by inverse of number of observations as in Table 1.

Table A4 replicates Table 2 from the main text while examining heterogeneity in $\Delta$ *Voteshare*$_{it}$. We observe that in both Panels A and B, the previous shift is predictive of a shift in the opposite direction in the current period irregardless of loss. Further, loss of power increases the magnitude of this “correction”. This relationship does not appear to be moderated by $\Delta$ *Voteshare*$_{it}$ (Panel A). Further, the conditional relationship that we document is stronger among parties that lost vote share and power (Panel B). The relationship seems to be attenuated in cases where the parties lose power while gaining votes, though the difference is not statistically significant.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | To Extreme, $t+1$ | | | | |
| **Panel A: Interaction with (Continuous) $\Delta$ Vote Share$_t$** | | | | | | | | |
| Loss of Power$_t$ | -0.893 | -0.852 | -2.117 | 0.428 | 0.622 | -0.623 | -3.539 | 2.320 |
| | (2.069) | (2.025) | (2.302) | (2.302) | (2.311) | (2.665) | (5.786) | (3.032) |
| To Extreme$_t$ | -0.407** | -0.391** | -0.381** | -0.416** | -0.418** | -0.411** | -0.342** | -0.475** |
| | (0.029) | (0.032) | (0.032) | (0.036) | (0.036) | (0.036) | (0.063) | (0.036) |
| Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_t$ | | -0.130 | -0.107 | -0.155+ | -0.151+ | -0.118 | -0.225 | -0.078 |
| | | (0.084) | (0.094) | (0.086) | (0.084) | (0.116) | (0.283) | (0.113) |
| $\Delta$ Vote share$_t$ | -0.023 | -0.031 | -0.020 | -0.038 | -0.017 | -0.024 | -0.159 | 0.015 |
| | (0.072) | (0.081) | (0.099) | (0.106) | (0.106) | (0.146) | (0.218) | (0.185) |
| Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ $\Delta$ Vote share$_t$ | -0.316+ | -0.307+ | -0.501+ | -0.240 | -0.194 | -0.272 | 0.137 | -0.875+ |
| | (0.164) | (0.164) | (0.266) | (0.192) | (0.205) | (0.334) | (0.539) | (0.513) |
| To Extreme$_t$ $\times$ $\Delta$ Vote share$_t$ | | -0.003 | -0.002 | -0.006 | -0.006 | -0.009 | 0.002 | -0.018 |
| | | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.009) | (0.008) | (0.012) |
| Lose Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_t$ $\times$ $\Delta$ Voteshare$_t$ | | 0.009 | 0.007 | 0.017 | 0.016 | 0.024 | 0.014 | 0.052* |
| | | (0.008) | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.012) | (0.016) | (0.021) | (0.026) |
| **Panel B: Interaction with Binary Indicator for Loss of Vote Share$_t$** | | | | | | | | |
| Loss of Power$_t$ | 3.250 | 3.435+ | 2.621 | 4.447+ | 4.267+ | 3.117 | -1.711 | 8.920* |
| | (2.006) | (1.961) | (2.314) | (2.314) | (2.321) | (2.643) | (3.584) | (3.742) |
| To Extreme$_t$ | -0.408** | -0.370** | -0.353** | -0.376** | -0.379** | -0.368** | -0.350** | -0.383** |
| | (0.029) | (0.037) | (0.043) | (0.044) | (0.044) | (0.052) | (0.074) | (0.074) |
| Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_t$ | | -0.218* | -0.213* | -0.286** | -0.276* | -0.287* | -0.368 | -0.295* |
| | | (0.089) | (0.102) | (0.099) | (0.102) | (0.126) | (0.221) | (0.133) |
| Loss of Vote share (binary)$_t$ | 1.048 | 1.039 | 0.379 | 1.456 | 1.562 | 0.444 | 0.484 | 0.044 |
| | (0.819) | (0.821) | (0.942) | (0.968) | (0.982) | (1.142) | (1.756) | (1.469) |
| Lose Power$_t$ $\times$ Loss of Vote share$_t$ | -8.492* | -8.908* | -7.485+ | -10.452* | -10.312* | -9.742+ | -14.424 | -12.699* |
| | (3.436) | (3.481) | (4.432) | (4.298) | (4.394) | (5.228) | (13.132) | (6.101) |
| To Extreme$_t$ $\times$ Loss of Vote share$_t$ | | -0.043 | -0.060 | -0.085 | -0.085 | -0.097 | 0.012 | -0.187 |
| | | (0.064) | (0.070) | (0.079) | (0.078) | (0.085) | (0.129) | (0.113) |
| Lose Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_t$ $\times$ Loss of Vote share$_t$ | | 0.155 | 0.197 | 0.216 | 0.202 | 0.279 | -0.087 | 0.419 |
| | | (0.189) | (0.212) | (0.223) | (0.218) | (0.264) | (0.695) | (0.283) |
| Vote share | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Platform, $t$ FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Out of Coalition, $t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Election FE | | | yes | | | yes | yes | yes |
| Party FE | | | | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Decade FE | | | | | yes | | | |
| Sample | | | | | | | Two-Party | > Two-Party |
| Observations | 1885 | 1885 | 1885 | 1885 | 1885 | 1885 | 812 | 1073 |

Standard errors are clustered by party.
$^{+}p < 0.10, ^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.005$

Table A23: Standard errors clustered at the party level. Countries are weighted by inverse of number of observations as in Table 2.

Table A4 replicates Table 3 Panel 2 from the main text while examining heterogeneity in $\Delta$ *Voteshare*$_{it}$. We observe that in both Panels A and B, that with a small selectorate, parties make larger shifts post-loss. The magnitude of the shift is attenuated where the selectorate is larger, though the statistical significance of these findings varies across models. This relationship does not appear to be moderated by $\Delta$ *Voteshare*$_{it}$ or its binned counterpart. Note that with lower $n$ due to the selectorate variable, these specifications are particularly underpowered.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Absolute Shift$_{t+1}$ | | | |
| **Panel A: Interaction with (Continuous) $\Delta$ Vote Share$_t$** | | | | | | |
| Loss of Power$_t$ | 9.223* | 6.468 | 9.334* | 9.069* | 12.173* | 1.950 |
| | (3.914) | (3.965) | (4.170) | (4.241) | (5.087) | (5.045) |
| Large Selectorate | -1.549 | -0.588 | -0.153 | 3.904 | 1.473 | 6.379* |
| | (2.229) | (2.468) | (2.398) | (3.865) | (6.694) | (2.663) |
| Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ Large Selectorate$_t$ | -4.720 | -1.973 | -7.873 | -10.593* | -15.011* | -1.942 |
| | (5.012) | (5.248) | (4.807) | (4.746) | (6.318) | (4.823) |
| $\Delta$ Vote share$_t$ | -0.051 | -0.094 | 0.056 | 0.041 | -0.059 | 0.110 |
| | (0.127) | (0.116) | (0.134) | (0.140) | (0.154) | (0.225) |
| Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ $\Delta$ Vote share$_t$ | 0.711 | 0.464 | 0.288 | 0.054 | 0.533 | 1.877 |
| | (0.470) | (0.484) | (0.523) | (0.556) | (0.678) | (1.485) |
| Large Selectorate$_t$ $\times$ $\Delta$ Vote share$_t$ | 0.071 | 0.127 | -0.052 | -0.054 | 0.276 | -0.595* |
| | (0.168) | (0.164) | (0.166) | (0.183) | (0.206) | (0.281) |
| Lose Power$_t$ $\times$ Large Selectorate$_t$ $\times$ $\Delta$ Vote share$_t$ | -0.376 | -0.247 | -0.104 | -0.621 | -1.658* | -1.256 |
| | (0.543) | (0.583) | (0.587) | (0.658) | (0.813) | (1.631) |
| **Panel B: Interaction with Binary Indicator for Loss of Vote Share$_t$** | | | | | | |
| Loss of Power$_t$ | 3.713$^+$ | 1.503 | 6.099$^+$ | 5.829$^+$ | 6.672$^+$ | -2.383 |
| | (2.191) | (2.500) | (3.201) | (3.163) | (3.706) | (4.467) |
| Large Selectorate$_t$ | -2.195 | -2.984 | 0.165 | 2.922 | -1.261 | 7.304* |
| | (2.092) | (2.669) | (2.082) | (4.276) | (6.977) | (2.939) |
| Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ Large Selectorate$_t$ | -3.499 | 1.238 | -7.700$^+$ | -3.791 | 0.174 | -1.073 |
| | (3.396) | (3.938) | (4.172) | (4.328) | (5.182) | (5.599) |
| Loss of Votes$_t$ | -1.386 | -3.134* | -0.453 | -1.728 | -1.445 | -1.506 |
| | (1.523) | (1.257) | (1.928) | (1.185) | (1.405) | (1.697) |
| Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ Loss of Votes$_t$ | 10.184 | 12.663 | 8.299 | 12.194 | 23.656 | 7.826 |
| | (12.283) | (12.717) | (11.259) | (11.588) | (16.541) | (5.988) |
| Large Selectorate$_t$ $\times$ Loss of Votes$_t$ | 1.596 | 4.844** | -0.660 | 1.886 | 4.790$^+$ | -1.733 |
| | (1.908) | (1.574) | (2.467) | (1.831) | (2.460) | (2.349) |
| Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ Large Selectorate$_t$ $\times$ Loss of Votes$_t$ | -0.652 | -8.497 | 0.473 | -10.111 | -43.195* | 3.043 |
| | (13.203) | (13.630) | (12.695) | (12.616) | (17.611) | (8.583) |
| Vote share$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Platform$_t$ FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Out of Coalition$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Country FE | yes | | yes | | | |
| Party FE | | yes | | yes | yes | yes |
| Decade FE | | yes | | | | |
| Election FE | | | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Sample | | | | | Two-Party | > Two Party |
| Observations | 1115 | 1115 | 1115 | 1115 | 551 | 564 |

Standard errors are clustered by party.
$^+p < 0.10, ^*p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.005$

Table A24: Standard errors clustered at the party level. Countries are weighted by inverse of number of observations as in Table 3.

Table A4 replicates Table 4 Columns [1]-[5] from the main text while examining heterogeneity in $\Delta$ *Voteshare*$_{it}$. We observe that in both Panels A and B, that with a small selectorate, parties that lost power at time $t$ appear to be electorally rewarded for subsequent shifts to the extreme, resulting in higher probabilities of returning to office in time $t + 2$. This relationship does not appear to be moderated by $\Delta$ *Voteshare*$_{it}$ or its binned counterpart.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Government Party, $t+2$ | | | | |
| **Panel A: Interaction with (Continuous) $\Delta$ Vote Share$_t$** | | | | | |
| Loss of Power$_t$ | -0.127$^+$ | -0.099 | -0.136 | -0.184 | -0.076 |
| | (0.073) | (0.071) | (0.086) | (0.154) | (0.097) |
| To Extreme$_{t+1}$ | -0.069 | -0.062 | -0.080 | -0.167 | -0.033 |
| | (0.055) | (0.044) | (0.060) | (0.108) | (0.066) |
| Lose Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_{t+1}$ | 0.404$^+$ | 0.486$^*$ | 0.541$^+$ | 0.169 | 0.687$^*$ |
| | (0.222) | (0.234) | (0.294) | (0.320) | (0.332) |
| $\Delta$ Vote share$_t$ | -0.006 | -0.000 | -0.002 | 0.006 | -0.007 |
| | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ $\Delta$ Vote share$_t$ | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.014 | 0.018 | -0.001 |
| | (0.008) | (0.006) | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.013) |
| To Extreme$_{t+1}$ $\times$ $\Delta$ Vote Share$_t$ | -0.014 | -0.011 | -0.008 | 0.009 | -0.011 |
| | (0.014) | (0.013) | (0.015) | (0.022) | (0.018) |
| Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_{t+1}$ $\times$ $\Delta$ Vote share$_t$ | 0.010 | 0.022 | 0.010 | -0.058 | 0.086 |
| | (0.031) | (0.026) | (0.038) | (0.035) | (0.069) |
| **Panel B: Interaction with Binary Indicator for Loss of Vote Share$_t$** | | | | | |
| Loss of Power$_t$ | -0.163$^*$ | -0.166$^*$ | -0.224$^{**}$ | -0.352$^{**}$ | -0.043 |
| | (0.062) | (0.062) | (0.077) | (0.112) | (0.084) |
| To Extreme$_{t+1}$ | -0.034 | -0.037 | -0.075 | -0.082 | -0.099 |
| | (0.061) | (0.065) | (0.073) | (0.097) | (0.100) |
| Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_{t+1}$ | 0.428$^+$ | 0.548$^*$ | 0.626$^*$ | 0.399 | 0.701$^*$ |
| | (0.232) | (0.235) | (0.293) | (0.349) | (0.351) |
| Loss of Votes$_t$ | -0.025 | 0.017 | 0.018 | 0.023 | 0.008 |
| | (0.022) | (0.017) | (0.021) | (0.031) | (0.028) |
| Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ Loss of Votes$_t$ | 0.077 | 0.119 | 0.176 | 0.304 | 0.015 |
| | (0.130) | (0.146) | (0.163) | (0.208) | (0.184) |
| To Extreme$_{t+1}$ $\times$ Loss of Votes$_t$ | 0.004 | 0.025 | 0.019 | -0.007 | 0.057 |
| | (0.022) | (0.021) | (0.028) | (0.023) | (0.061) |
| Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_{t+1}$ $\times$ Loss of Votes$_t$ | -0.082 | -0.060 | -0.018 | -0.151 | 0.109 |
| | (0.101) | (0.101) | (0.121) | (0.196) | (0.135) |
| Vote share$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Platform$_t$ FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Out of Coalition$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Party FE | | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Election FE | yes | | yes | yes | yes |
| Sample | | | | Two-Party | > Two Party |
| Observations | 1886 | 1886 | 1886 | 813 | 1073 |

Standard errors are clustered by party.
$^+p < 0.10, ^*p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.005$

Table A25: Standard errors clustered at the party level. Countries are weighted by inverse of number of observations as in Table 4.

## A5 Coverage of Data Set

The primary feature that conditions our sample is the availability of the CMP classification of platforms. We note, however, that for most results, we require three elections worth of platforms. To calculate the shift preceding an electoral event (loss of power) we require platforms the coding of platforms $P_t$ and $P_{t-1}$. To look at electoral shifts subsequent to the electoral event, we require platforms $P_{t+1}$ and $P_t$.

Denote party $i$'s platforms $P_t$ for $t \in \{1, ..., T\}$ where 1 indexes the first platform in the CMP dataset and $T$ indexes the most recent platform in the CMP dataset. Our units of analysis consist of $P_t$ for $t \in \{2, ..., T-1\}$. When there exist other limitations on the availability of data, the sequence of platforms includes the second until penultimate platforms given available data.

There are three specifications reported in the table and appendix for which such there are substantially different subsamples, as documented and graphed below.

1. Figure A2 depicts the full sample used in Tables 1, 2, and 4 of the main paper as well as Table A3.
2. Figure A3 depicts the sample for which selectorate coding is available that is used in Table 3.
3. Figure A4 depicts the sample for which we can construct the moving average of platforms used in Table A4.
4. Figure A5 depicts the sample for which we estimate the conditional association of low growth used in Table A5.1.


Figure A2: This graph plots the coverage of the main dataset used in Tables 1, 2, and 4 in the paper as well as Table A3. Each point represents one election. Where elections are missing entirely in CMP (after the first election in each country), there is no point. The share missing refers to the share of platforms that do not enter the dataset in a given election, typically because it is a party's first or last election.


Figure A3: This graph plots the coverage of the selectorate measure using moving averages used in Table 3. Each point represents one election. Where elections are missing entirely in CMP (after the first election in each country), there is no point. The share missing refers to the share of platforms that do not enter the dataset in a given election, typically because it is a party's first or last election. With the selectorate data, we have additional party-level missingness, particularly among small parties. The grey points indicate elections for which we have no selectorate data for any party contesting the election.


Figure A4: This graph plots of the platform measure using moving averages used in Table A3. Each point represents one election. Where elections are missing entirely in CMP (after the first election in each country), there is no point. The share missing refers to the share of platforms that do not enter the dataset in a given election, typically because it is in the party's first two or last elections.


Figure A5: This graph plots of the platform measure using moving averages used in Table A5.1. Each point represents one election. Where elections are missing entirely in CMP (after the first election in each country), there is no point. The share missing refers to the share of platforms that do not enter the dataset in a given election, typically because it is a party's first or last election or because growth data is unavailable.

## A5.1 Ancillary Results on Growth

Recent arguments–both popular and academic–suggest that poor economic performance may be associated with the adoption of extreme platforms. In the present context, we look at whether poor economic performance before a loss of power conditions the association between loss of power and subsequent platform shifts.

We code "Low Growth" as a binary indicator taking a value of "1" when growth in the year prior to the election is less than 1 country-standard deviation below the country mean. We find that low growth is not significantly associated with the direction of the ideological shift, nor does it appear to condition the association between loss of power and the magnitude ideological shifts. In all specifications, both the level of growth and its interaction with electoral loss remain well below statistical significance. Alternative measures of valence economic conditions (e.g. rate of unemployment) reveal a similar pattern of a weak association at best.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | To Extreme$_{t+1}$ | | | | | |
| Loss of Power$_t$ | 1.317 | 1.556 | 2.347 | 1.340 | -5.707 | 5.967 |
| | (2.246) | (2.324) | (2.628) | (3.059) | (4.287) | (4.050) |
| Low Growth $_t$ | 1.480 | -0.506 | -0.630 | -34.710$^{*}$ | -10.667 | -46.408$^{*}$ |
| | (1.898) | (1.850) | (2.024) | (17.612) | (18.064) | (16.582) |
| Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ Low Growth$_t$ | -2.520 | -3.402 | -3.543 | -1.468 | 0.511 | 0.392 |
| | (4.743) | (5.002) | (6.674) | (8.222) | (10.948) | (10.974) |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| | Absolute Shift, $t+1$ | | | | | |
| Loss of Power$_t$ | 2.445 | 2.802$^{+}$ | 3.024 | 2.372 | 2.847 | 1.626 |
| | (1.682) | (1.687) | (1.872) | (1.872) | (2.683) | (2.376) |
| Low Growth$_t$ | -0.057 | -0.107 | -1.068 | 43.086$^{**}$ | -27.914$^{+}$ | -2.962 |
| | (1.454) | (1.500) | (1.598) | (11.922) | (14.308) | (7.097) |
| Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ Low Growth$_t$ | 0.121 | -0.462 | 3.647 | 6.878 | 12.153 | -4.408 |
| | (3.236) | (2.782) | (3.918) | (5.488) | (7.371) | (5.124) |
| Voteshare$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| $\Delta$ Voteshare $_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Platform$_t$ FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| In Coalition$_t$ | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Country FE | | yes | | | | |
| Party FE | | | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Decade FE | | | yes | | | |
| Election FE | | | | yes | yes | yes |
| Sample | | | | | Two-Party | > Two Party |
| Observations | 1419 | 1419 | 1419 | 1419 | 642 | 777 |

Standard errors are clustered by party.
$^{+}p < 0.10, ^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.005$

Table A26: Standard errors clustered at the party level.

# A6 Theoretical Model

## A6.1 Quantities of Interest

In this section, we describe formally the quantities that we calculate numerically from the infinite horizon model that correspond to the empirical quantities that we estimate. First, we define the following notation to describe relevant sets of states.

Define:

- $\mathcal{S}$ as the set of eight states of the form $(i, f_L, f_R)$
- $\mathcal{R} = \{(R, m, m), (R, e, m), (R, m, e), (R, e, e)\}$, as the states in which $R$ is the incumbent
- $\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{S} \setminus \mathcal{R}$, as the states in which $L$ is the incumbent
- $\mathcal{F}_{Re} = \{(R, m, e), (R, e, e), (L, m, e), (L, e, e)\}$, as the set of states in which $R$'s lead faction is extreme
- $\mathcal{F}_{Rm} = \{(R, m, m), (R, e, m), (L, m, m), (L, e, m)\}$, as the set of states in which $R$'s lead faction is moderate
- $\mathcal{F}_{Le} = \{(R, e, m), (R, e, e), (L, e, m), (L, e, e)\}$, as the set of states in which $L$'s lead faction is extreme
- $\mathcal{F}_{Lm} = \{(R, m, m), (R, m, e), (L, m, m), (L, m, e)\}$, as the set of states in which $L$'s lead faction is extreme

We now derive the three quantities of interest. All quantities are expressed in terms of an $R$ incumbent party. The calculation for the $L$ party is symmetric.

#### Probability of Running on an Extreme Platform

Suppose $R$ is the incumbent. The first quantity compares the party's probability of running on an extreme platform following loss of power vs. re-election.

After loss of power:

$$\sum_{s \in \mathcal{R}} \left( q_s \sum_{s' \in \mathcal{L}} Q_{s,s'} \left( \sum_{s'' \in \mathcal{F}_{Re}} Q_{s',s''} \right) \right) \tag{2}$$

After re-election:

$$\sum_{s \in \mathcal{R}} \left( q_s \sum_{s' \in \mathcal{R}} Q_{s,s'} \left( \sum_{s'' \in \mathcal{F}_{Re}} Q_{s',s''} \right) \right) \tag{3}$$

**Probability of Reversal of Platform**

Suppose $R$ is the incumbent. The second quantity compares the party's probability of platform reversal following loss of power vs. re-election.

After loss of power:

$$\sum_{\substack{s\in\\ \{(R,m,m),\\ (R,e,m)\}}} q_s\Big( \sum_{\substack{s'\in\\ \{(L,m,e),\\ (L,e,e)\}}} Q_{s,s'}\Big( \sum_{s''\in\mathcal{F}_{Rm}} Q_{s',s''}\Big)\Big) + \sum_{\substack{s\in\\ \{(R,m,e),\\ (R,e,e)\}}} q_s\Big( \sum_{\substack{s'\in\\ \{(L,m,m),\\ (L,e,m)\}}} Q_{s,s'}\Big( \sum_{s''\in\mathcal{F}_{Re}} Q_{s',s''}\Big)\Big) \tag{4}$$

After reelection:

$$\sum_{\substack{s\in\\ \{(R,m,m),\\ (R,e,m)\}}} q_s\Big( \sum_{\substack{s'\in\\ \{(R,m,e),\\ (R,e,e)\}}} Q_{s,s'}\Big( \sum_{s''\in\mathcal{F}_{Rm}} Q_{s',s''}\Big)\Big) + \sum_{\substack{s\in\\ \{(R,m,e),\\ (R,e,e)\}}} q_s\Big( \sum_{\substack{s'\in\\ \{(R,m,m),\\ (R,e,m)\}}} Q_{s,s'}\Big( \sum_{s''\in\mathcal{F}_{Re}} Q_{s',s''}\Big)\Big) \tag{5}$$

**Probability of Adjustment**

Suppose $R$ is the incumbent. We compare the party's probability of platform shift following loss of power vs. re-election.

After loss of power:

$$\sum_{s\in\mathcal{R}} q_s\Big( \sum_{\substack{s'\in\\ \{(L,m,e),\\ (L,e,e)\}}} Q_{s,s'}\Big( \sum_{s''\in\mathcal{F}_{Rm}} Q_{s',s''}\Big)\Big) + \sum_{s\in\mathcal{R}} q_s\Big( \sum_{\substack{s'\in\\ \{(L,m,m),\\ (L,e,m)\}}} Q_{s,s'}\Big( \sum_{s''\in\mathcal{F}_{Re}} Q_{s',s''}\Big)\Big) \tag{6}$$

After reelection:

$$\sum_{s\in\mathcal{R}} q_s\Big( \sum_{\substack{s'\in\\ \{(R,m,e),\\ (R,e,e)\}}} Q_{s,s'}\Big( \sum_{s''\in\mathcal{F}_{Rm}} Q_{s',s''}\Big)\Big) + \sum_{s\in\mathcal{R}} q_s\Big( \sum_{\substack{s'\in\\ \{(R,m,m),\\ (R,e,m)\}}} Q_{s,s'}\Big( \sum_{s''\in\mathcal{F}_{Re}} Q_{s',s''}\Big)\Big) \tag{7}$$

## A6.2 Proof of Proposition 2

The following lemma presents a preliminary result on calculating transition probabilities. For notational convenience, we present the result for transitions where party $R$ wins re-election; transitions involving party $L$ victories are defined analogously.

**Lemma 1** Transition Probabilities. *The transition probability between states $(R, f_L, f_R)$ and $(R, f'_L, f'_R)$ is:*

$$Q_{(R,f_L,f_R),(R,f'_L,f'_R)} = \eta_{f_L,f'_L}(\lambda_d)\pi_{f_R,f'_R}(\lambda_v)\eta(y_L^{i'}, \theta_{f_L,f'_L}(\lambda_d)b, y_R^{j'}, \theta_{f_R,f'_R}(\lambda_v)b; y_m)$$

*where $\eta_{f_i,f'_i}(\lambda)$ is the probability of adjustment from faction $f_i$ to faction $f'_i$ within party $i$:*

$$\eta_{m,m}(\lambda) = 1 - \lambda\pi_i\rho \tag{8}$$

$$\eta_{m,e}(\lambda) = \lambda\pi_i\rho \tag{9}$$

$$\eta_{e,m}(\lambda) = \lambda\pi_i(1-\rho) \tag{10}$$

$$\eta_{e,e}(\lambda) = 1 - \lambda\pi_i(1-\rho), \tag{11}$$

*and $\theta_{f_i,f_i'}(\lambda)$ is the probability of a factional quality $b_i = b$, conditional upon adjustment from faction $f_i$ to faction $f_i'$ within party $i$:*

$$\theta_{m,m}(\lambda) = \frac{\rho}{1-\lambda\pi_i\rho} \tag{12}$$

$$\theta_{m,e}(\lambda) = 1 \tag{13}$$

$$\theta_{e,m}(\lambda) = \frac{\rho}{1-\rho} \tag{14}$$

$$\theta_{e,e}(\lambda) = \frac{\rho}{1-\lambda\pi_i(1-\rho)}. \tag{15}$$

**Proof.** First observe that the probability of factional transition is independent of the result of an upcoming election. By Proposition 1, the party decisive voter always nominates the high quality candidate if one exists and she has the opportunity. The opportunity arises with probability $\lambda\pi_i$, where $\lambda = \lambda_v$ if the party won the preceding election and $\lambda = \lambda_d$ otherwise. Denote the probability of transition of lead faction from $f_i$ to $f_i'$ by $\eta_{f_i,f_i'}(\lambda)$.

Thus starting from faction $m$ as the lead faction, the lead faction becomes $e$ with probability $\eta_{m,e}(\lambda) = \lambda\pi_i\rho$. The lead faction remains $m$ otherwise. Similarly, starting from $e$ as the lead faction, the lead faction becomes $m$ with probability $\eta_{e,m}(\lambda) = \lambda\pi_i(1-\rho)$, since $m$ is chosen whenever faction $e$ does not have a high quality candidate. The lead faction remains $e$ otherwise.

To calculate party $R$'s probability of victory conditional upon the factional transitions $f_L$ to $f_L'$ and $f_R$ to $f_R'$, we use expression (9) from the main text, which gives the probability of an $R$ victory $\eta(\cdot)$. This expression is obviously linear in $b_L$ and $b_R$, and therefore the desired probability is given by substituting in the expected values of $b_L$ and $b_R$, conditional upon the factional transitions. To calculate $\theta_{e,e}(\lambda)$, we use Bayes' rule to calculate $\Pr\{b_i = b \mid f_i = f_i' = e\}$:

$$\frac{\Pr\{f_i = f_i' = e \mid b_i = b\}\Pr\{b_i = b\}}{\Pr\{f_i = f_i' = e|b_i = b\}\Pr\{b_i = b\} + \Pr\{f_i = f_i' = e|b_{-i} = b\}\Pr\{b_{-i} = b\} + \Pr\{f_i = f_i' = e|b_i = b_{-i} = 0\}\Pr\{b_i = b_{-i} = 0\}}$$

$$= \frac{1\cdot\rho}{1\cdot\rho + (1-\lambda_v\pi_i)\rho + (1-\lambda_v\pi_i)(1-2\rho)}$$

$$= \frac{\rho}{1-\lambda_v\pi_i(1-\rho)}.$$

This produces expression (15). The calculations for other values of $\theta_{f_i,f_i'}(\lambda)$ are similar and therefore omitted. ■

Proposition 2 considers transitions that start from state $(R, m, m)$. We restrict attention to the case where $y_m = 0$, $\pi_L = \pi_R = \sigma$, $\lambda_v = \lambda_d = 1$, and $\Delta = 2y_R^M$.

**Proposition 2** Platform Adjustment Following Losses and Wins. *Let $y_m = 0$, $\pi_L = \pi_R = \sigma$, $\lambda_v = \lambda_d = 1$, and $\Delta = 2y_R^M$. If $\delta > b(1 - \frac{\rho}{1-\rho\sigma})$, then starting from state $(R, m, m)$, the probability that party $R$ loses, followed by:*

*(i) running on an extreme platform;*

*(ii) platform reversal;*

*(iii) platform adjustment*

*is higher than the probability that it wins, followed by the same event.*

**Proof.** For each part, we calculate the difference in probabilities of observing each event following wins and losses. Note that each part is conditional upon state $(R, m, m)$.

(i) We simplify expression (2) to obtain party $R$'s probability of running on an extreme platform following loss of power is:

$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{L}}_{ext} = \sum_{s' \in \mathcal{L}} Q_{(R,m,m),s'} \left( \sum_{s'' \in \mathcal{F}_{Re}} Q_{s',s''} \right)$$

Likewise, using (3), party $R$'s probability of running on an extreme platform following re-election is:

$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{R}}_{ext} = \sum_{s' \in \mathcal{R}} Q_{(R,m,m),s'} \left( \sum_{s'' \in \mathcal{F}_{Re}} Q_{s',s''} \right)$$

Each expression requires the calculation of 20 transition probabilities. Using the result of Lemma 1 and performing the appropriate substitutions produces:

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{L}}_{ext} &= \frac{\rho\sigma\left(\alpha(2-\sigma) + b(1-\sigma)\left(\rho(1+\sigma)-1\right) + \delta(1-\sigma)(1-\rho\sigma)\right)}{2\alpha} \\
\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{R}}_{ext} &= \frac{\rho\sigma\left(\alpha(2-\sigma) + b(1-\sigma)(1-\rho(1+\sigma)) - \delta(1-\sigma)(1-\rho\sigma)\right)}{2\alpha}.
\end{aligned}$$

The difference evaluates to:

$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{L}}_{ext} - \hat{Q}^{\mathcal{R}}_{ext} = \frac{\rho\sigma(1-\sigma)(b(\rho(1+\sigma)-1) - \delta(1+\rho\sigma))}{\alpha}$$

Solving for $\delta$ produces the condition for this difference to be positive.

(ii) We simplify expression (4) to obtain party $R$'s probability of running on an extreme platform following loss of power is:

$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{L}}_{rev} = \sum_{\substack{s' \in \\ \{(L,m,e), \\ (L,e,e)\}}} Q_{(R,m,m),s'} \left( \sum_{s'' \in \mathcal{F}_{Rm}} Q_{s',s''} \right)$$

Likewise, using (5), party $R$'s probability of running on an extreme platform following re-election is:

$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{R}}_{rev} = \sum_{\substack{s' \in \\ \{(R,m,e), \\ (R,e,e)\}}} Q_{(R,m,m),s'} \left( \sum_{s'' \in \mathcal{F}_{Rm}} Q_{s',s''} \right)$$

Each expression requires the calculation of 10 transition probabilities. Using the result of Lemma 1 and performing the appropriate substitutions produces:

$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{L}}_{rev} = \frac{(1-\rho)\rho\sigma^2(\alpha + b(\rho(1+\sigma)-1) + \delta(1-\rho\sigma))}{2\alpha}$$
$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{R}}_{rev} = \frac{(1-\rho)\rho\sigma^2(\alpha - b(\rho(1+\sigma)-1) - \delta(1-\rho\sigma))}{2\alpha}.$$

The difference evaluates to:

$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{L}}_{rev} - \hat{Q}^{\mathcal{R}}_{rev} = \frac{\rho\sigma^2(1-\rho)(b(\rho(1+\sigma)-1) + \delta(1-\rho\sigma))}{\alpha}$$

Solving for $\delta$ produces the condition for this difference to be positive.

(iii) We simplify expression (6) to obtain party $R$'s probability of running on an extreme platform following loss of power is:

$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{L}}_{adj} = \sum_{\substack{s'\in \\ \{(L,m,e), \\ (L,e,e)\}}} Q_{(R,m,m),s'}\left(\sum_{s''\in\mathcal{F}_{Rm}} Q_{s',s''}\right) + \sum_{\substack{s'\in \\ \{(L,m,m), \\ (L,e,m)\}}} Q_{(R,m,m),s'}\left(\sum_{s''\in\mathcal{F}_{Re}} Q_{s',s''}\right)$$

Likewise, using (7), party $R$'s probability of running on an extreme platform following re-election is:

$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{R}}_{adj} = \sum_{\substack{s'\in \\ \{(R,m,e), \\ (R,e,e)\}}} Q_{(R,m,m),s'}\left(\sum_{s''\in\mathcal{F}_{Rm}} Q_{s',s''}\right) + \sum_{\substack{s'\in \\ \{(R,m,m), \\ (R,e,m)\}}} Q_{(R,m,m),s'}\left(\sum_{s''\in\mathcal{F}_{Re}} Q_{s',s''}\right)$$

Each expression requires the calculation of 20 transition probabilities. Using the result of Lemma 1 and performing the appropriate substitutions produces:

$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{L}}_{adj} = \frac{\rho\sigma\left(\alpha(1-2\rho\sigma+\sigma) + (1-2\rho)\sigma(b(\rho(1+\sigma)-1) + \delta(1-\rho\sigma))\right)}{2\alpha}$$
$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{R}}_{adj} = \frac{\rho\sigma\left(\alpha(1-2\rho\sigma+\sigma) - (1-2\rho)\sigma(b(\rho(1+\sigma)-1) + \delta(1-\rho\sigma))\right)}{2\alpha}.$$

The difference evaluates to:

$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{L}}_{adj} - \hat{Q}^{\mathcal{R}}_{adj} = \frac{\rho\sigma^2(1-2\rho)(b(\rho(1+\sigma)-1) + \delta(1-\rho\sigma))}{\alpha}$$

Solving for $\delta$ produces the condition for this difference to be positive. Note that this result is identical to those in parts (i) and (ii). ■

## Supplementary Appendix: References


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